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NOTES
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Granada Electronics, Inc.: The Cabbage
Patch Doll Goes Gray?
Recent judicial and administrative decisions have forced both the
judicial and executive branches to confront the problems posed by
"gray-market" goods.' In Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Granada Electronics, Inc., the Supreme Court in 1987 denied certi-
orari review of a gray-market goods case involving the trademark
1. See Cohen, Grey Market Imports and the International Location of Manufacturing,
11 N.C.J. Ir'L L. & Com. REG. 172 (1986); In Re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 6 I.T.R.D.
(BNA) 1849, reprinted in 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 823 (1984), disapproved by President Reagan,
50 Fed. Reg. 1655, reprinted in 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 862 (disapproved pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(g) (1982)), appeal dismissed sub nom. Duracell, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (The International Trade Commission excluded the
importation of Duracell batteries manufactured in Belgium to avoid confusion by consumers
with U.S. made Duracells. However, President Reagan disapproved the exclusion order saying
that the ITC decision was at odds with the current Customs and Administration policy and
would prejudice the pending study of the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade. The
Judiciary has no jurisdiction to review the veto of the President). See also 2 J. McCAxnam ,
TFAnmzAmus AND UNrrm ComnnoN § 30:35 (2d ed. Supp. 1984); Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 143 (1987); NEC Electronics v. Cal. Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1987); Vivitar
Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986);
Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 1986) petition for cert. filed 55
U.S.L.W. 3372 (No. 86-757, Nov. 6, 1986); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American
Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), jurisdiction aff'd sub
nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 1419 (recalendared for argument on the
merits, No. 86-625, March 7, 1988)).
The United States Supreme Court finally decided a case concerning "gray-market" goods
in March, 1988. However, the emphasis of the case tamed on a jurisdictional issue, only
secondarily addressing the issue of "gray-market" goods. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 56
U.S.L.W. 4219 (affirming jurisdiction) (recalendared for argument on the merits, No. 86-625,
March 7, 1988). Otfier courts and commentators have given the term various spellings, such
as "grey market," "grey-market," and "gray market," indicating the considerable confusion
in this area.
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owner of the Cabbage Patch Kids doll and a gray marketeer of
Spanish made Cabbage Patch Kids dolls.2
In Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics,
Inc., a plaintiff trademark owner prevailed and the court issued a
permanent injunction against a U.S. distributor, enjoining it from
importing foreign-made Cabbage Patch Kids dolls into the United
States.3 The U.S. distributor had obtained its supply of Cabbage
Patch Kids dolls from a Spanish licensee of Original Appalachian
Artworks Incorporated (OAA) in contravention of a restrictive cov-
enant in a licensing agreement not to export the dolls to the United
States. 4 While the court's decision was based in part on the enforce-
ment of this restrictive covenant, additional legal problems continue
to plague the area of gray-market goods in general.
This writer will first explore the continuing legal development of
gray-market goods emphasizing the interrelationship between section
526 of the Tariff Act and the Customs Service regulations. This
writer's focus will be on the decision of Original Appalachian, Inc.
v. Granada Electronics, Inc., and how it might provide a solution
to the problems associated with gray-market goods.
I. LEoA BACKGRoUND
A. Gray-Market Goods
"Gray-market" goods are items "produced and legitimately sold
in competition with goods of the owner of U.S. trademark rights in
the identical mark. "5 Foreign-manufactured products bearing a United
States registered trademark that enter the United States for sale in
competition with the products of the trademark owner without that
trademark owner's consent are defined as "gray-market goods." 6
When the U.S. trademark holder is also the importer of the goods,
the gray-market goods are known as "parallel importations."17 Par-
allel imports and gray-market goods must be distinguished from
2. 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 143 (1987).
3. Id.
4. Granada, 640 F. Supp. at 931.
5. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
6. 'See, e.g., Alkaline Batteries, 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1849; Vivitar Corp. v. United
States, 761 F.2d 1552, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986); Granada, 816 F.2d at 68; K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4219 (affirming jurisdiction) (recalendared for argument
on the merits, No. 86-625, March 7, 1988).
7. See 2 McCA~RTY, supra note 1, § 30:35; Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1555.
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counterfeit goods, which are not genuine and usually unlawful.8
Counterfeit goods, unlike gray-market goods, do not carry the orig-
inal trademark and are "manufactured" by entities who are unau-
thorized to do so.9
In this age of expanding international trade, companies naturally
desire to expand their markets. Since an American manufacturer
wants to maintain an exclusive right to sell its product within the
United States, it will restrict a foreign manufacturer's sales of its
trademarked goods to certain territories.' 0 One way in which a
manufacturer can facilitate entry into a foreign market is by thus
transferring rights to manufacture,' sell and distribute the product to
a foreign entity in a licensing agreement." Gray-market activity often
occurs after a transnational corporation has taken similar steps to
have its goods produced and sold in a foreign market.'? Due to the
contractual relationship between the U.S. mark holder-licensor and
the foreign entity-licensee, the subsequent use of the trademark or
copyright will not amount to actionable infringement. 3 The mark
owner, however, still wants to restrict the trademarked goods from
entering its territory.
"Gray-market" goods are or tend to be attractive to consumers
because they have prices lower than the original products.' 4 However,
gray-market goods pose problems for trademark owners because they
generally do not carry the same warranties, safety warnings, instruc-
tions or quality controls that mark owners provide for their own
goods. 5 These problems may be manifested by consumer confusion
and loss of goodwill in the trademark. 6
To limit these potential difficulties of consumer confusion and lost
goodwill, trademark owners and trade, associations have sought legal
8. McDermott, The Gray Market in the United States: Law, Policy, and Myth, 2 CoNN.
J. INT'L LAW 1 (1986).
9. Id.
10. Issues of vertical trade restrictions and antitrust will be triggered in the minds of
many readers. See infra text accompanying notes 180-82.
11. This transfer of rights may be done by contract. Most often a licensor-licensee
relationship is established.
12. It must be assumed that this hypothetical transnational corporation owni the trademark
to its product, and is the exclusive United States manufacturer and supplier to the United
States market.
13. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
14. Fitzpatrick & Brunnet, Barring Importation of Gray Goods Under § 42 of the Lanham
Act, and § 526 of the Tariff Act, in GRAY MAEKT AND PAuALLEL IMPORTATIoN: PROTEc-
TIoNIs vs. FanE TRADg, PATNTS, CoPYRiGHs, - TRADEdmAis, AND LrrERAatY PRoPERTY:
CouRsa HANDBoo" Smures NuummL 217 9 (1986) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick].
15. Id.
16. Id. af 11.
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solutions to prevent "gray goods" from entering their markets. 17 To
date, however, the courts have not agreed on a uniform treatment
of "gray-market goods." ' The approach used by Original Appala-
chian proved successful and appears to be one way of expanding a
trademark owner's ability to control importation of gray-market
goods.
B. Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 192219
Section 526 is an amendment to the 1922 Tariff Act enacted in
response to the Second Circuit appellate holding in A. Bour/ois v.
Katzel.20 The purpose of section 526 of the Tariff Act is to protect
the interests of the American trademark owner and its right to control
the use of its registered trademark.21
Section 526 makes it "unlawful to import into the United States
any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise
17. See infra text accompanying notes 23-30.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 23-73.
19. Tarrif Act of 1922 § 526, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1922) (reenacted without change as part
of the Tariff Act of 1930 and codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982)).
20. In Bourjois v. Katzel, the United States Supreme Court allowed a perfume manufac-
turer to halt the importation of face powder in competition with the U.S. mark holder. A
French company, E. Wertheimer & Cie. (formerly A. Bourjois & Cie.), sold its United States'
business related to face powder, known under its trademark JAVA, to A. Bourjois & Co., a
New"York corporation. In 1913, Wertheimer sold all of its rights in the United States to its
trademarks, trade dress (a distinguished type of packaging), and trade names. Bourjois (NY)
purchased the JAVA face powder in bulk from Wertheimer, which it then packaged for retail
sale in the same style of box which Wertheimer had used in the United States and was
continuing to use in France. Sometime prior to 1921, defendant Katzel, owner of a retail
pharmacy in New York City, bought a quantity of Wertheimer's retail-packaged JAVA face
powder in France and began selling the product in her New York store as well as to other
retailers.
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's finding of non-infringement, and found
that consumers would be confused, believing that Bourjois "sponsored" the sale of the face
powder Katzel bought from France. Finding that consumer confusion as to the source of the
face powder was enough to constitute trademark infringement, the Court enjoined Katzel from
further sales of the JAVA powder. The Cotlrt's opinion stated that the local independent
corporation (Bourjois (NY)) had developed goodwill separate from that of the foreign manu-
facturer and that purchasers would idehitify Bourjois as the source standing behind the quality
of the goods sold under the JAVA trademark. Since Bourjois (NY) did not stand behind the
goods sold by Katzel; the Court held that there was a likelihood of confusion and damage to
Bourjois' (NY) goodwill. This resulted in a judicial ban on parallel importation. 260 U.S. 689
(1923).
Section 526 of the Lanham Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982), was enacted a few months before
the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision in A. Bourois v. Katzel. For a
general discussion of A. Bourois v. Katzel, consult Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d.
1552, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
21. Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035, 1037 (2d Cir 1931); see Vivitar Corp.
v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1055 (1986); see
also 71 CoNo. REc. 3871 (1929) (remarks of Sen. George) cited in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4219, 4222 (recalendared for argument on the merits No. 86-625, March 7,
1988); 62 CoNG. REc. 11603 (1922) (remarks of Sen. Sutherland), cited in K Mart, 56 U.S.L.W.
at 4222.
1988 / Original Appalachian Artworks
bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or
association created or organized within, the United States, and reg-
istered in the Patent and Trademark Office... unless written consent
of the owner of such trademark is produced at the time of making
entry. '12 Since gray goods bear the trademark of a genuine good,
the literal language of section 526 seems to suggest that all gray
goods should be excluded from entry into the United States by the
Customs Service.Y
The Customs Service, however, has not adopted this interpretation
of section 526 and has refused to bar imports in instances in which
the same or affiliated companies own the U.S. and the foreign
trademark, or in cases in which the U.S. trademark owner has
authorized the foreign manufacturer to use the trademark.2 Once an
American company has listed a foreign firm as an authorized man-
ufacturer and distributor of its product, the Customs Service refuses
to exclude the importation of these goods, even upon demand by
the U.S. trademark holder.2 United States Customs regulations do
not bar importation of goods once they have been recorded with the
Service.26
Currently, a trademark owner may not make immediate resort to
the exclusion remedies provided under section 526(c) of the Tariff
22. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
23. See, Coalition to Preserve the Integrity (COPIAT) v. United States, 790 F.2d 844,
908-18 (Customs Services' regulations, allowing the admittance of grey goods, contrary to
Congressional intent behind § 526 which was that the U.S. Customs Service was obliged to
halt the importation of parallel imports), jurisdiction aff'd sub noma. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4219 (recalendared for argument on the merits, No. 86-625, March 7, 1988).
24. S. Lipner, Gray Market Goulash: The Problem of at-the-Border Restrictions on
Importation of Genuine Trademarked Goods, 77 TRADmL&IU REP. 102, 103 (1987), reprinted
in 20 CoRNar IuV'L L. Ra,. 103, 104 (1987).
25. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1561.
26. 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.2(d), 133.12(d). The United States Customs Service requires that a
United States company disclose foreign affiliated companies as part of the information required
upon recordation of its mark. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1561 (citing 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.2(d),
133.12(d)). Since 1951, the Customs Service has issued several letters describing a consistent
policy toward foreign-manufactured goods bearing trademarks owned by Americans under §
526. The policy of the Customs Service is that if the United States trademark owner and the
owner of the foreign rights to the same mark are one and the same person, articles produced
and sold abroad by the foreign owner may be imported by anyone, the trademark owner has
itself either introduced or authorized the introduction of the articles into commerce and
thereafter may not unreasonably restrict the use of the product. Coalition to Preserve the
Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844, 850 (D.D.C.
1984) (referring to Customs Service Letters dated March 27, 1951, July 2, 1962, March 19,
1963, June 27, 1962, and December 11, 1968), rev'd 790 F.2d 844, jurisdiction aff'd sub nom.
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4219 (recalendared for argument on the merits,
No. 86-625, March 7, 1988).
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Act.27 Recent decisions hold that the mark owner does not have a
right to require that the Customs Service prevent importation of all
"gray-market" goods.28 Presently, the mark owner must seek pro-
tection against persons engaging in parallel importation by first
pursuing a private claim in court. The private claim may be based
on breach of contract, trademark infringement or copyright infringe-
ment." The mark owner is successful in the suit against the private
party is then entitled to have the parallel imports excluded by the
Customs Service.3 0
In most cases concerning intellectual property, a plaintiff will seek
an injunction to prevent the sale and distribution of another's goods.
It is generally accepted that a preliminary injunction may be granted
only upon a showing of "(a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) a
likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation along
with a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party
requesting the preliminary relief." 31
The judiciary, and executive branch, through the United States
Customs Service, have failed to agree as to a consistent interpretation
of section 526. This inability to accommodate competing policies has
resulted in numerous inconsistent cases.
C. Recent Case Law Developemnt Involving Gray-Market Goods
In Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo,2 plaintiff Osawa & Co. was a
Delaware corporation and registered owner of the U.S. trademark
rights for MAMIYA marks. 33 This trademark applied to high quality
27. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(c) (1982) Cinjunction and damages). "Any person dealing in any
such merchandise may be enjoined from dealing therein within the United States or may be
required to export or destroy such merchandise or to remove or obliterate such trademark and
shall be liable for the same damages and profits provided for wrongful use of a trademark,
under the provisions of 15 U.S.C. §§ 81-109 (1982)." Id.
28. Original Appalachian Artworks v. Granada Electronics, 816 F.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1987)
(citing Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 1986), petition for cert.
filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3372 (No. 86-757, Nov. 6, 1986)); in accord, Vivitar Corp. v. United
States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1569-70 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986). But see,
COPL4T, 790-F.2d at 916-17.
29. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982) (allowing owner of United States trademark to bring suit to
enjoin importers, of products bearing the plaintiff's registered United States trademark).
30. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570; see Olympus, 792 F.2d at 320.
31. See, e.g., Granada, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,986 at 62,052 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Bell & Howell: M~miya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1983); Atari, Inc.
v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics, Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 613 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
32. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
33. Id. at 1165.
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photographic equipment manufactured in Japan by Mamiya Camera
Company. 34 Plaintiff brought suit against the discount camera dealers
who were importing gray-market goods bearing a Mamiya mark,
based on theories that section 526 was violated and that its trademark
was infringed.35 The court stated that to obtain a preliminary in-
junction a party must make a showing of (a) irreparable harm and
(b) either (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, or (2) sufficiently
serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground
for litigation.36 A balance of hardships will tip decidedly toward the
party requesting the preliminary relief.37 In Osawa, the court found
that the test was met and concluded that Osawa had made out a
case entitling it to preliminary relief under section 526, as well as
for trademark infringement.
Plaintiff Osawa showed that the gray-market imports resulted in
consumer confusion, and therefore damage in the "consumers' eyes
to the reputation of the mark." ' This consumer confusion caused
adverse effects on plaintiff's business reputation. 39 The "gray mar-
keteers" attempted a "free ride" on the plaintiff's marketing strat-
egies and advertising, which resulted in the defendant's monetary
gains at the expense of harm to the plaintiff's goodwill.40 The
defendants had not advertised as to the quality of Mamiya products,
but merely advertised lower prices; 41 Because they only sought a price
advantage, the defendants had no incentive to support the goodwill
of the products they sold.42 As a practical matter, the plaintiff was
forced to honor warranties on the gray-market goods because failure
to do so would have further hurt its reputation. 43 Customers would
not know the cameras they purchased were from the gray-market
because the defendants did not advertise them as "gray-market"
Mamiya Cameras. 44 Thus, not only were defendants operating free
of the significant costs of warranty repairs, but sales of cameras
34. Id. at 1166.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1165; Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42, 45 (2d
Cir. 1983); Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)
(per curiam).
37. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1165.
38. Id. at 1168.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1167.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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without warranties would increase plaintiff's costs. 45 Furthermore,
the court found that the wide price disparity between the legitimate
cameras and gray goods cameras damaged the goodwill of the Ma-
miya trademark; consumers would question why the same products
could be bought so cheaply at different places.4 6 This would ultimately
result in assumptions by the buyers that the plaintiff was "price
gouging," thus creating further hostility toward the mark.47 Ulti-
mately, the defendants were enjoined from dealing in gray-market
Mamiya products.48
The Osawa decision has been subject to much criticism within the
federal circuits. In Olympus Corp. v. United States,49 the Second
Circuit disagreed with the Osawa court's interpretation of section
526.50 The Olympus court found section 526 and the Customs Service
regulations inconsistent, upholding the Customs Service regulations
and affirming the district court's dismissal of Olympus' section 526
claim.5' However, the Olympus court recognized the United States
trademark owners rights to pursue private remedies under section
526(c) to have gray-market goods excluded.52
In NEC Electronics v. Cal Circuit Abco,5 3 a U.S. subsidiary of a
Japanese parent company (NEC) brought suit against an importer
who had purchased NEC's computer chips on the foreign market
and sold them in the United States.5 4 The District Court granted a
preliminary injunction based on trademark infringement under the
Lanham Trade-Mark Act.55
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.5 6 Despite the finding
of consumer confusion as the source of the computer chips, the court
reasoned that the parent and subsidiary companies were commonly
controlled, and that the subsidiary was therefore not losing any
benefits for which it had bargained. 57 The parent company was not
attempting to evade any terms of its trademark agreement with its
45. Id. at 1168.
46. Id. at 1169.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 792 F.2d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 1986).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 321.
52. Id. at 320.
53. 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1987).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1511.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1509.
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subsidiary.58 The subsidiary should have legitimately expected that
the parent would sell computer chips to other companies for sale in
the United States, thereby circumventing the subsidiary's business. 59
The NVEC court stated that its decision was "reinforced by the fact
that the Customs Service has for decades made an exception to
section 526 in cases where the American trademark owner and the
foreign producer are under common control." The court concluded
that the U.S. subsidiary had no right to have the gray-market
computer chips excluded. 60
The case of Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trade-
marks (COPIAT) v. United States provides the most recent guidance
for cases involving gray-market goods. 61 COPIAT is an association
of U.S. trademark owners.62 The association brought suit against the
Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
United States, asking for a declaration that the Customs regulations
allowing the entrance of "gray goods" were inconsistent with section
526 and therefore invalid. 63 The D.C Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the Custom Service's interpretation of section 526 did not display
the necessary "thoroughness, validity, and consistency" to merit
judicial acceptance and found them invalid. 4 The lower appellate
court in COPIAT discussed the legislative history of section 526 of
the Tariff Act and determined that Congressional intent was to have
the Customs Service enforce the statute by excluding importations' of
gray-market goods.6S
Two issues were presented for review to the Supreme Court, but
the Court based its holding on the jurisdictional question, remanding
for re-argument the question whether the challenged Customs regu-
lation was a reasonable agency interpretation of section 526 of the
Tariff Act. 6 In a five to three decision, the Court affirmed the
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1510.
60. Id. at 1510 n.4.
61. 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), jurisdiction aff'd sub. nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4219 (recalendared for argument on the merits, No. 86-625, March 7, 1988).
62. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 598 F. Supp. 844, 846 (D. D.C. 1984), rev'd 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), jurisdiction
af.f'd sub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4219 (recalandered for argument
on the merits, No. 86-625, March 7, 1988).
63. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 904.
64. Id. at 916.
65. Id.
66. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4219, 4220 (recalendared for argument
on the merits, No. 86-625, March 7, 1988).
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appellate court's holding that the federal district court had jurisdic-
tion to hear a challenge to the Secretary of the Treasury's regulation
permitting the importation of certain gray-market goods.67
In dicta, Justice Brennan did appear to recognize that section 526
provides a mechanism by which a private party, at its option, may
enlist the aid of the Customs Service in excluding foreign-made goods
bearing its trademark. 8 The Court went on to say that, "the trade-
mark owner has sole authority to decide that all products bearing its
trademark will enter or that none will, and to decide what entity
may import them, under what conditions, and for what purpose." 69
In Vivitar Corp. v. United States, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Customs Service did
not violate section 526 of the Tariff Act when it failed to exclude
aU types of "gray-market" importations. 70
In Vivitar, the court held that the United States Customs Service,
at its discretion, may authorize the admission of gray-market goods.7'
Under current law, the mark owner does not have a right to require
the Customs Service to prevent importation of all "gray-market"
goods.7 A mark owner must first pursue a private claim against the
67. Id. Petitioners, 47th Street Photo, Inc., and K Mart Corporation intervened as
defendants and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Court of International Trade
had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3) grants the Court of International
Trade exclusive jurisdiction over suits against the Government arising out of federal laws that
provide for "embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of merchandise
for reasons other than the protection of the public health or safety. . ." The Court defined
"embargo" as used in § 1581(i)(3) as a governmentally imposed quantitative restriction-of
zero-on the importation of merchandise. The majority, in affirming the rejection of Petitioners'
motion, held that § 526's importation prohibition is not such an "embargo." Rather than
reflecting a governmental restriction on the quantity of a particular product that will enter, it
merely provides a mechanism by which a trademark owner might, at its own option, enlist
the Customs Service's aid in barring foreign-made goods bearing its trademark in order to
enforce its own private trademark right. Id. at 4222.
68. Id. at 4222. The court gave the following example:
Suppose ... that a domestic producer grants a foreign distributor exclusive distri-
bution rights abroad, and that a provision of the contract, captioned "Importation
prohibited," bars the foreign distributor from competing for domestic sales. If the
foreign distributor nevertheless brazenly imports into the United States, the domestic
manufacturer may invoke any of a number of contract remedies-including monetary
or injunctive relief in court-enforcing its private right.
Id.
69. Id.
70. 761 F.2d at 1552.
71. Id.
72. Granada, 816 F.2d at 71 (citing Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 320
(2d Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3372 (Nov. 6, 1986) (No. 86-757)); accord
Fivitar, 761 F.2d 1552. But see, Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks
(COPIAT) v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (customs regulations allowing
importation of gray goods inconsistent with statute governing entry of trademarked goods),
jurisdiction aff'd sub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4219 (recalendared
for argument on the merits, No. 86-625, March 7, 1988).
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parallel importer to obtain assistance from the Customs Service. 73
Until the Supreme Court holds otherwise, the theories asserted in
Vivitar Corp v. United States74 remain a guide for' the trademark
holder attempting to exclude the importation of gray-market goods.
II. Taa CASE OF Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada
Electronics, Inc.
A. The Facts
The Plaintiff/Appellee Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. (OAA)
is incorporated in the state of Georgia.75 OAA owns American and
foreign copyrights and trademarks in Cabbage Patch Kids dolls. 76
The Defendant/Appellant Granada Electronics, Inc. (Granada) is a
New York corporation. 77 Granada is a U.S. importer and distributor
of Cabbage Patch Kids dolls manufactured in Spain by an OAA
licensee.78
Cabbage Patch Kids dolls were introduced into the United States
market in May 1977.79 Since that time, Original Appalachian Art-
works, Inc. has been a party to numerous lawsuits. 0 A majority of
73. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570.
74. Id.
75. Granada, 640 F. Supp. at 929.
76. Granada, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,986 at 62,051 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
77. Granada, 640 F. Supp. at 929.
78. Id.
79. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Blue Box Factory, 577 F. Supp. 625, 626
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
80. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. J.F. Reichert, Inc., 658 F.Supp. 458 (E.D.
Pa. 1987) (OAA granted injunction against importer of Cabbage Patch Kids dolls plus statutory
damages of $250 for each copyright infringement as well as attorney's fees for the copyright
infringement part of the suit. Importer not liable for damages or attorney's fees for violations
of trademark law.); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. McCall Pattern Co., 825 F.2d
355 (Ilth Cir. 1987) (OAA claims for copyright and unfair competition denied by the District
Court; McCall moved for reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505. Parties,
upon court's approval entered into a consent order for $100,000.); Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (Merchandiser
of "Garbage Pail Kids" bubble gum stickers and products injured owner of the "Cabbage
Patch Kids" mark.); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Yuil Int'l Trading Corp., 105
F.R.D. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Denial of a motion to set aside default judgement against Yui1
in case filed by OAA, claiming copyright infringement, unfair competition, common law
trademark infringement, and dilution.); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Blue Box
Factory (USA) Ltd., 877 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Court denied injunctive relief against
producer of another line of dolls due to failure to show likelihood of success on the merits);
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Cradle Creations Inc., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80 (N.D.
Ga. 1983) (Preliminary injunction issued for contribution infringement against defendant book
publisher who published pattern book containing instructions for making copies of dolls that
were substantially similar to OAA's copyrighted dolls); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc.
v. Toy Loft, 684 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1982) (judgment for OAA in copyright and trade dress
infringement suit concerning "The Little People" dolls).
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the litigation has been the area of intellectual property, including
trademark and copyright infringement, trade secret violation, unfair
competition, and consumer confusion."'
The original Cabbage Patch Kids doll was a hand-sewn, soft-
sculptured doll created by Xavier Roberts, President of OAA.8 2 Not
originally named "Cabbage Patch Kids," the original dolls were
known as the "Little People" and were sold at a retail price in
excess of U.S. $100.83 Roberts incorporated OAA in the fall of 1978,
and on June 1, 1979 obtained a copyright certificate for the dolls. 4
In December, 1979 Roberts assigned his rights in the copyright to
OAA. 85
The continuing commercial success of the Cabbage Patch Kids
dolls has been attributed to the marketing techniques initially em-
ployed by Xavier Roberts. 86 The dolls are "adopted" by consumers
at what OAA calls "adoption centers." 87 In fact, "adoption centers"
are primarily specialty stores and finer department stores. 8 OAA has
approximately 450 outlets around the United States.8 9 The customer
is provided with 'a "birth certificate" and "official adoption pa-
pers."' 9 Each doll is individually named, accompanied by a matching
name tag.9' Printed on the derriere of each doll is the name of its
creator, "Xavier. ' ' 2 The consumer is also sent a birthday card on
the first anniversary of the date of purchase.93 The process of
distribution for the "birthday card" begins when the "adopting
parent" mails his or her adoption papers to OAA and the relevant
information is entered in OAA's computer. These unique marketing
concepts, along with intense advertising campaigns, have turned the
Cabbage Patch Kids into a phenomenon on the order of the "Hula
Hoop," the "Pet Rock," and other comparable triumphs of the
American toy industry. 94
81. See supra note 80.
82. Granada, 816 F.2d at 70.
83. Granada, 640 F. Supp. at 929.
84. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, 684 F.2d 821, 823 (11th Cir. 1982).
85. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Blue Box Factory (USA) Ltd., 877 F. Supp
625, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
86. Toy Loft, 684 F.2d at 823.
87. Granada, 640 F. Supp. at 929.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Toy Loft, 684 F.2d at 823.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Blue Box Factory, 577 F. Supp. 625, 626
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In August, 1982, OAA granted Coleco Industries an exclusive
license to -manufacture, sell and distribute its dolls which were newly
dubbed as the "Cabbage Patch Kids." 95 The dolls marketed by Coleco
are a smaller version of OAA's "Little People" dolls. 96 In addition,
the Coleco dolls have vinyl heads, are mass produced, and not hand-
sewn.97 The Coleco-produced dolls come in boxes which prominently
feature the CABBAGE PATCH KIDS trademark and distinctive
Cabbage Patch packaging. (The "Little People" dolls were unpack-
aged.) 98 The Coleco dolls retail for U.S. $35 to U.S. $45. Further-
more, they are accompanied by an English version of a birth certificate
and adoption papers which display the Cabbage Patch Kids copy-
right.99 Once the "adopting parent" returns the adoption papers to
Coleco, he or she receives a birth certificate, as well as a card on
the first birthday of the doll.t °°
Coleco was initially granted exclusive worldwide distribution rights
for the Cabbage Patch Kids dolls, but subsequently relinquished its
worldwide rights, which allowed OAA to enter into agreements with
foreign manufacturers and distributors. 101 To this date, Coleco In-
dustries remains the exclusive distributor of Cabbage Patch Kids dolls
within the United States. °2
In 1984, OAA granted a restricted license to Jesmar S.A., a Spanish
corporation, to manufacture and distribute the Coleco version of the
Cabbage Patch Kids doll.1°3 This license allowed the manufacture
and distribution of the doll by Jesmar in Spain, the Canary Islands,
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). In 1981 OAA sold 71,127 dolls and in 1982 39,895 dolls. In 1983, Coleco,
OAA's eiclusive United States manufacturer, sold 2,840,000 dolls. Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. v. McCall Pattern, 649 F. Supp. 892, 835 (11th Cir. 1987). Despite the well
publicized shortage of supply, the high sales of the Cabbage Patch Kids dolls became "the
most successful doll introduction in history." Blue Box Factory, 577 F. Supp. at 626.
95. Blue Box Factory, 577 F. Supp. at 626. The licensing agreement was entered into
through Schlfer Nance and Company, Inc., (SNC) whereby SNC was engaged to act as
OAA's exclusive agent to license the CABBAGE PATCH dolls' rights to others. Granada,
640 F. Supp. at 930.
96. Granada Electronics, 640 F. Supp. at 930.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Coleco's Cabbage Patch Kids dolls that are sold in the United States are manufactured
in Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China. McDermott, supra note
8, at 6 n.21. More than 52 companies have obtained licenses to produce "Cabbage-Patch"
products. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Blue Box Factory, 577 F. Supp. 625, 626
(11th Cir. 1987) (referring to What a Doll: The Cabbage Patch Craze, Newsweek, December
12, 1983, at 78; The Strange Cabbage Patch Craze, Time, December 12, 1983, at 64).
103. Granada, 640 F. Supp. at 930.
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Andorra and Ceuta Melilla.104 Jesmar contractually agreed not to
make, sell or authorize any sale of the licensed products outside its
licensed territory.05 Furthermore, all of Jesmar's sales of the Cabbage
Patch Kids dolls were required to contain an express agreement that
the purchaser would not use or resell the licensed products outside
these licensed territories.'6 OAA collected a royalty from Jesmar for
each doll that was sold.'07
The Jesmar dolls came packaged in boxes bearing the "legend"
of the dolls'0 8 and most of the other wording on the boxes in
Spanish.'0 Moreover, the CABBAGE PATCH KIDS trademark was
displayed on the box." 0 The copyright notice on the rear panel of
the box contained the address of OAA: Original Appalachian Art-
works, Inc., Cleveland, Georgia, U.S.A."'
The Jesmar dolls were sold with birth certificates and "adoption
papers" completely in the Spanish language.1 2 Purchasers were di-
rected to send the "adoption papers" to an address in Spain." 3
In December 1984 OAA and Coleco became aware that the vinyl-
headed Cabbage Patch Kids dolls manufactured by Jesmar and other
foreign licensees were being sold within the United States." 4 OAA
and Coleco began receiving letters and phone calls (12 to 15 per day)
from people complaining about dolls with foreign language birth
certificates and adoption papers." 5 Approximately 40% of these calls
received by Coleco concerned the Jesmar Spanish dolls." 6 These
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 930 n.1. If OAA receives a larger royalty from the foreign manufacturer
(licensee) than from Coleco (the exclusive United States distributor of the dolls), OAA may
even benefit financially from the alleged grey market activity. Even if the foreign licensee sells
dolls at a lower royalty per doll than Coleco, and the sale of every licensee doll results in that
loss of a sale on "one of the more lucrative Coleco dolls," it is still not clear that OAA has
suffered irreparable economic harm. Granada, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 62,053.
108. The Legend of the Cabbage Patch Kids is that, "many years ago a young boy named
Xavier happened upon an enchanted cabbage patch where he found very special little people
who called themselves Cabbage Patch Kids. To help fulfill the Cabbage Patch Kids' dream of
having families with whom to share their love, Xavier set about building a special place known
as Babyland General, where the Cabbage Patch Kids remain until each is chosen for adoption."
Granada, 640 F. Supp. at 930, n.1.
109. Id. at 930.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 931.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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Jesmar dolls were being imported into the United States by Granada
Electronics, Inc." 7 Granada Electronics, Inc. received Jesmar's Cab-
bage Patch Dolls and resold them through jobbers'18 and retail chains
in the United States.119
OAA sent both a letter and a telex to each of its foreign licensees
reminding them that, as licensees, they were contractually obligated
to keep doll sales within their designated territory.' 20 OAA filed at
least 24 lawsuits in the United States against distributors .and im-
porters of the foreign-made Cabbage Patch Kids dolls,' 2' including
the instant action against Granada in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York.'2
B. Procedural Background
1. OAA's Theories
OAA originally alleged two causes of action against Granada. The
first claim was for alleged infringement of OAA's U.S.-registered
trademark CABBAGE PATCH KIDS under the Trademark Act of
1946 (Lanham Act).'2 The second cause of action was for infringe-
ment of OAA's U.S.-registered copyright of the design of the dolls
under the Copyright Act of 1976.' 24
2. Granada's Counterclaim Theory
Granada counterclaimed, charging OAA with violations of federal
antitrust laws and the New York State Donnelly Act.'1 Granada
argued that OAA's territorial licensing scheme constituted a vertical
restraint of trade in that it eliminated intra-brand competition and
artificially raised the price of Cabbage Patch Kids dolls in each
territory. 26
117. Id.
118. A jobber is one who buys and sells goods for others; one who buys and sells articles
in bulk and resells them to dealers; a merchant buying and selling in job lots. In general, a
jobber is a wholesaler; one who buys and sells small lots; a middleman. BLAcK's LAW
DicoTIARY 749 (5th ed. 1979).
119. Id.
120. Granada, 640 F. Supp. at 932.
121. Id.
122. Original Appalachian Artvyorks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 928
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
123. Granada, 640 F. Supp. at 929.
124. Id.
125. N.Y. Grm. Bus. LAw § 340 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1986).
126. Granada, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,986, at 62,053.
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3. The Trial Court's Action
The District Court initially denied OAA's motion for a preliminary
injunction pending a consolidated evidentiary hearing on the motion
and an expedited trial on the merits. 127 The copyright claim was later
voluntarily dismissed with prejudice.'2 A motion to dismiss Grana-
da's federal and state antitrust counterclaims was granted.
2 9
Thus, what remained was "the always troublesome issue of whether
the owner of a registered United States trademark can prevent the
sale [in the United States] of imported 'gray goods' bearing the
trademark which are manufactured abroad under license from the
owner."13 0
After hearing evidence on the merits, the District Court issued a
permanent injunction against Granada. 3' Granada was permanently
enjoined from further importation of the Jesmar dolls and other
Cabbage Patch dolls made abroad under similar territorially-restricted
licenses.132 The court held that OAA's right to protection against
unauthorized sales of imported dolls in the United States was not
extinguished by the listing of the foreign manufacturer (Jesmar) on
the owner's (OAA) application for recordation of the United States
trademark CABBAGE PATCH KIDS with the Customs Service. 33
Furthermore, the court held that the owner of a trademark could
prevent the sale of "gray goods" bearing an original United States
trademark which were manufactured abroad under a territorially-
restricted license. 34
127. FED. R. Crv. PRoC. 65(a)(2) (consolidation of hearing with trial on merits). Before
or after the commencement of the hearing of an application for a preliminary injunction, the
court may order the trial of the action of the merits to be advanced and consolidated with
the hearing of the application. Even when this consolidation is not ordered, any evidence
received upon an application for a preliminary injunction which would be admissible at trial
on the merits becomes part of the trial record and need not be repeated upon the trial. This
subdivision [(a)(2)] shall be so construed and applied as to save the parties any rights they
may have to trial by jury. Id.
128. Granada, 640 F. Supp. at 929.
129. Granada, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,986, at 62,055 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
130. Granada, 640 F. Supp. at 929.
131. Id. at 928.
132. Id. at 933.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 928.
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C. The Appellate Opinion
1. Majority
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed that OAA had a right to
relief under the Lanham Act from potential consumer confusion as
to whether it sponsored the importation of these genuine but "in-
ferior" dolls.135 The court held that the likelihood of consumer
confusion as to the source of origin constituted a violation under
the Lanham Act.1 36 Section 32 of the Lanham Trademark Act of
194637 prohibits the unauthorized sale of goods bearing a registered
trademark where there is a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or
deception of purchasers. 38
The CABBAGE PATCH KIDS trademark registration in the in-
stant case had been received by OAA from the United States Patent
Office on October 2, 1984.139 The Trademark Registration was there-
after recorded with the United States Customs Service, and Jesmar
was listed on the application for Customs recordation.Y4 Since Jesmar
was recorded on the trademark registration, the Customs Service
permitted the importation of the gray-market Cabbage Patch Kids
dolls. 41 As noted previously, Customs Service regulations do not
provide for halting importation of gray-market goods made abroad
under license, such as Jesmar's Spanish Cabbage Patch Kids dolls.142
135. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc., 816 F.2d at 76
(Cardamone, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 73.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1982).
138. Granada, 816 F.2d at 71 (citing Syntex Laboratories, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co.,
437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971)).
139. Granada, 640 F. Supp. at 931.
140. Id. The regulations of the U.S. Customs Service, 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.2(c), 133.21-.24
(1985) direct a party to state in its application, "the name and principal business address of
each foreign person or business entity authorized or licensed to use the trademark and a
statement as to the use authorized."
141. The Customs Service Regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(2), allows third parties to
import trademarked goods without the permission of the American markholder where the
markholder is either a parent or subsidiary of, or is held in common ownership with, a foreign
manufacturer. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing 19
C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(2) (1985)) petition for cert. filed 55 U.S.L.W. 3372 (No. 86-757, Nov. 6,
1986).
142. Granada, 640 F. Supp. at 931. See also, Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of
American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States, 598 F. Supp at 844, 849-50 (D.D.C. 1984),
rev'd, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), jurisdiction aff'd sub. nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4219 (recalendared for argument on the merits, No. 86-625, March 7, 1988);
Olympus Corp., F.2d at 319; Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1177
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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Section 32 of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 prohibits the
unauthorized sale of goods bearing a registered trademark when there
is a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception of purchasers. 143
The owner's registration of the trademark CABBAGE PATCH KIDS
with the Customs Service was prima facie evidence of validity of
such registration and of the owner's exclusive right to use the
trademark. 144 Applying the standard of confusion, mistake or decep-
tion, the appellate court adopted the trial court finding that the
Jesmar (Spanish) dolls were "materially different" from the Coleco
dolls because of the different languages used in the birth certifi-
cates. 45 The similarities in the packaging and prominent display of
the CABBAGE PATCH KIDS trademark on the boxes were found
to cause public confusion as to origin of the dolls. 46 The numerous
phone calls and letters from doll owners was evidence that the public
was confused, or mistook the Jesmar dolls for the Coleco dolls. 47
OAA's and Coleco's domestic goodwill was damaged by consumer
confusion caused by the importation of the Jesmar dolls. 148 Purchas-
ers of the Jesmar dolls were unable to properly process the Spanish
language adoption papers in the United States.1 49 Purchasers naturally
expected that dolls sold in the United States bearing the trademark
CABBAGE PATCH KIDS would include birth certificates and adop-
tion papers in the English language which then could be mailed to
a" addressee in the United States, who would process the adoption
papers and return them to the "parent.' ' 50 Therefore, consumers
were misled, disappointed and frequently held OAA and/or Coleco
responsible.' 5 ' While the court held that OAA was under no legal or
moral obligation to process the Spanish adoption papers and supply
birth certificates to the purchasers of the Jesmar dolls, as trademark
owner OAA was injured due to resulting damaged goodwill. 152
143. Granada, 816 F.2d at 71 (citing Syntex Laboratories, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmaca
Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971)); S.Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted
in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERv.).
144. Granada, 816 F.2d at 71.
145. Id. at 73.
146. Id.
147. Granada, 640 F. Supp at 931.
148. Granada, 816 F.2d at 73.
149. Id. The United States "fulfillment houses," that processed the Cabbage Patch Kids
dolls' adoption papers were unwilling to process Jesmar's adoption papers or mail adoption
certificates and birthday cards to Jesmar doll owners. Id.
150. Granada, 640 F. Supp. at 931.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 933.
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The court thus affirmed the trial court decision that OAA was
entitled to a permanent injunction against the distributor-of the
foreign-made dolls, permanently preventing Granada from further
importation of the Jesmar dolls and other Cabbage Patch dolls made
abroad under territorially-restricted licenses. 153,
2. Concurrence
Circuit Judge Cardamone's concurrence is enlightening for its
discussion of Lanham Act violations, as it clarifies the rationales set
forth in the majority opinion and discusses the functions and prin-
ciples behind the application of trademark law.' 54 Judge Cardamone
states that the essential element of an action under section 32 of the
Lanham Act is a showing of the likelihood of consumer confusion
as to the source of the product's origin.155 In determining whether
the importation of "genuine" Cabbage Patch dolls creates a likeli-
hood of confusion as to its "source," it was necessary for Judge
Cardamone to examine the three major functions and principles of
trademark law: (1) the "Trade Identity Theory," (2) the "Guarantee"
153. Granada, 816 F.2d at 73 (citing Lanham Trade-Mark Act, § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 114
(1982); distinguishing Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42, 45.46
(2d Cir. 1983)); cf. Premier Dental Products Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850,
859 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding irreparable damage to goodwill even though gray good was identical
to goods sold by trademark owner), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 436 (1986).
154. Judge Cardamone commented as follows:
The majority states that the imported dolls were not intended to be sold in the
United States and were "[materially] different" from those of the mark's owner
because the adoption papers and birth certificates were in Spanish. [The majority
holds] that it is this difference that creates confusion over the source of the product
and constitutes the Lanham Act violation.
Granada, 816 F.2d at 74 (Cardamone, J. concurring).
These satements are confusing. The court is merely attempting to say that, even though the
dolls are "materially different," the consumers are still confused as to the source of the dolls.
Purchasers of the Jesmar Cabbage Patch Kids dolls will believe that they were authorized for
sale in the United States by Coleco and attempt to have the adoption papers processed through
Coleco's "fulfillment houses." When the fulfillment houses refused to process any adoption
papers from foreign manufactured dolls, OAA's domestic goodwill was being damaged. A
reasonable consumer would not understand why the originator of the Cabbage Patch Kids
doll was not willing to process the "adoption papers" from a product they introduced into
the market. J. Cardamone agrees that there is confusion over the source of the product, and
that Granada should be permanently enjoined because of their infringing OAA's trademark.
However, he reaches the conclusion in a different manner than the majority's "materially
different" standard. Id.
155. 1c1. at 74 (Cardamone, J., concurring) (citing.Church of Scientology Int'l v. The
Elmira Mission of the Church of Scientology, 794 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1986); Miss Universe,
Inc. v. Patricelli, 753 F.2d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1985); Berlitz Schools of Languages, Inc. v.
Everest House, 619 F.2d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1980); McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc.,
599 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1979); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d
44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979) (per curiam)).
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function of trademark law, and (3) the doctrine of trademark "Ex-
haustion."56
The function of the "Trade Identity Theory" is to identify the
ultimate source of the goods, i.e., the owner of the mark. 57 Logically,
there can be no confusion as to the source of the goods under the
Trade Identity Theory when the domestic owner of the mark licenses
use of its mark by a foreign manufacturer. 158 Thus, Judge Cardamone
found no rationale for granting a Lanham Act injunction because
Jesmar's Cabbage Patch Kids dolls carried a genuine trademark that
accurately portrayed OAA as the originator of the product. 59
The second theory that Judge Cardamone considered is the "Guar-
antee" function of trademark law. Trademark law serves to guarantee
the quality of the trademarked product t60 Confusion as to source of
origin or sponsorship is therefore sufficient to constitute a violation
of the Lanham Act.' 61 The Lanham Act imposes an affirmative duty
on the licensor to maintain quality control over its product. 16 2 OAA
fulfilled this affirmative duty to maintain quality control by imposing
contractual sales restrictions in its licensing agreements. 63 Thus,
insofar as Granada's importation of inferior dolls confused the public
as to OAA's sponsorship, OAA had a right to bring suit against
Granada. 64 However, Judge Cardamone also noted that the impor-
tation of genuine, but inferior, goods of a foreign licensee might be
the fault of the trademark owner "in not exercising adequate super-
vision of the mark."' 65 The failure of a mark owner to provide
adequate supervision "should not be justification for protecting the
mark owner, from importation of gray-market goods, under the
trademark laws for the situation it has created."' 66 However, it was
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing 3A R. CAZuANN, UiNFm ComPETmoN, TRADEmAIKS AND MoNoPoLIs §
21.17, at 76; 2 S. LADAS, PATNTS, TnnanuRKs AND RELATED RIG=rrs § 732, at 1341 (1975);
Takamatsu, Parallel Importation of Trademarked Goods: ,A Comparative Analysis, 57 vASH.
L. REv. 433, 453 (1982).
158. Id. (citing 3A R. CA~mrtaut, supra note 157, at 76; 2 S. LADAs, supra note 157, at
1341; Takamatsu, supra note 157, at 457).
159. Granada, 816 F.2d at 75.
160. Id. at 76.
161. Id. at 75. Confusion as to "sponsorship" means the same as confusion as to "source
of origin." Id. (citing Societe Comptoir De L'Industrie Cotonniere v. Alexander's Dep't Stores,
299 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1962)).
162. Granada, 816 F.2d at 75.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (referring to Vandenburgh, The Problem of Importation of Genuinely Marked
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found that the restrictive license was an effort by OAA to supervise
its mark and prevent the importation of the Cabbage Patch dolls by
third party distributors. 167 Without further means of controlling the
distribution of its product, such as imposing an "equitable servitude"
on the dolls, Judge Cardamone found OAA entitled to protection
against importation of gray-market goods under the guarantee func-
tion of trademark law.168
The third theory, the doctrine of "Exhaustion," operates to protect
the gray marketeer. This theory provides that a distributor has the
right to resell a branded item in an unchanged state.169 The rationale
is that trademark rights are "exhausted" once unaltered trademarked
goods have been placed into the market.10 However, this doctrine
does not apply to genuine goods which have been altered.171 In
Granada Electronics, literature and packaging of the Cabbage Patch
dolls was adapted to attract Spanish-speaking consumers.172 Because
the goods were thereby altered, Judge Cardamone would have found
the "Exhaustion" doctrine inapplicable. 73
Judge Cardamone found that the importation of Jesmar's Spanish
dolls created the likelihood of consumer confusion as to whether
OAA sponsored the importation of these genuine but "inferior"
dolls. 74 This confusion, in light of the "Guarantee" function of
trademark law, created a violation of the Lanham Act, entitling OAA
to relief. 75 Granada's importation of Jesmar's Cabbage Patch Kids
dolls was an interference with the OAA's right to control the quality
of its own product. 76
Therefore, Judge Cardamone concluded that Granada's importa-
tion of Jesmar dolls created a likelihood of consumer confusion as
to the source of origin and this constituted a Lanham Act violation.'"
Goods is Not a Trademark Problem, 49 TRADEmApac REP. 707, 716 (1959). See also Parfums
Stem, Inc. v. United States Customs Service, 575 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (Criticizing
mark owner for seeking federal trademark protection "to insulate itself from what it placed
in motion itself through its own foreign manufacturing and distribution sources.").
167. Under its license Jesmar agreed not to sell outside of its territory, and to sell only to
purchasers who also agreed not to sell outside that territory. Granada, 816 F.2d at 75.
168. Id. at 75-76.
169. Id. at 76.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 76.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 1
Thus, Judge Cardamone affirmed the injunction to prevent further
importation of Spanish Cabbage Patch Kids dolls by Granada.178
In addition, the court found Granada's antitrust allegations insuf-
ficient.179 Granada argued that OAA's territorial licensing scheme
constituted a vertical restraint of trade by eliminating intra-brand
competition and artificially raising the price of Cabbage Patch Kids
dolls.'8 Granada's evidence of a wide price disparity along with a
shortage of the Cabbage Patch dolls in the United States was insuf-
ficient to show that the territorial restrictions caused antitrust injury
to the importer-distributor of foreign-made dolls.' 8' In fact, allegedly
inflated prices were what made it economically feasible and profitable
for Granada to purchase dolls in Europe and import them into the
United States. 82
Furthermore, the court rejected Granada's claim that OAA's in-
fringement suit was itself an antitrust violation because there was no
evidence that the suit was brought in bad faith, or to harass Gran-
ada. 83
A petition for writ of certiorari in Original Appalachian Artworks,
Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc. to the Supreme Court of the United
States was denied on October 5, 1987.8 4
III. LEGAL RAM CATIONS
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc.,
is an important case for its potential impact on two areas involving
gray-market goods. The case follows the rule set forth in Vivitar
Corp. v. United States, that a plaintiff trademark owner must first
pursue a judicial declaration of its rights before seeking the aid of
the Customs Service to exclude gray-market goods. Moreover, while
the irreparable harm required to support an injunction may be unique
to the Cabbage Patch Kids dolls situation, the decision adds to the
developing body of case law in this area.
In requesting a preliminary injunction, OAA was confronted with
the irrefutable fact that it collected a royalty from Jesmar S.A. for
178. Id.
179. Id. at 74.
180. Granada, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,986, at 62,053.
181. Granada, 816 F.2d at 74; cf. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik v. Action Industries, Inc.,
589 F. Supp. 763, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (antitrust counterclaim to gray good copyright
infringement suit dismissed because importer would have benefited from high domestic prices).
182. Granada, 1986-1 Trade Case (CCH) 66,986, at 66,054.
183. Id.
184. 108 S. Ct. 143 (1987).
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each foreign doll that allegedly infringed OAA's American copy-
right."Is Therefore, the argument was advanced that OAA may not
have suffered monetary harm from the distributor's alleged infringe-
ment, or irreparable harm of any kind. 8 6 Again, the showing of
irreparable harm is a predicate when injunctive relief is sought.1 87
However, the court found in Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc.
v. Granada Electronics, Inc. that the "likelihood" of confusion over
the source of the Cabbage Patch Kids dolls was sufficient evidence
of damage to OAA's goodwill to support a permanent injunction. 88
Another basis for injunctive relief may be the inadequacy of legal
remedies.18 9 OAA did not have to wait until actual confusion occurred
because, under trademark law, the showing of a likelihood of con-
sumer confusion as to source of origin was compelling.'90 Requiring
that a trademark owner wait until actual confusion and damage to
goodwill occurr would result in an irreparable situation. An injunc-
tion is imposed to prevent any further harm from occurring. Once
a consumer has viewed a certain mark as untrustworthy, the consumer
will mistrust the product which bears the corresponding trademark.
The-mark owner, in turn, has lost a customer who will no longer
purchase and recommend its products in the future.
The standard for "irreparable harm" in the instant case is consis-
tent with the interpretations in other gray-market goods cases. The
standard requiring irreparable harm used in Original Appalachian,
Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc. was adopted in the case of NEC
Electronics v. Cal Circuit Abco, although the court failed to find
irreparable harm sufficient to support an injunction.' 9' The NEC
185. Granada, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,053.
186. Id. If OAA receives a larger royalty from the foreign manufacturer (licensee), than
from Coleco (the exclusive United States distributor of the dolls), OAA may even benefit
financially from the alleged grey market activity. Even if the foreign licensee sells dolls at a
lower royalty per doll than Coleco, and the sale of every licensee doll results in that loss of
a sale on "one of the more lucrative Coleco dolls," it is still not clear whether OAA has
suffered irreparable economic harm.
187. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
188. 816 F.2d at 71.
189. Beacon Trheaters, Inc. v. Westover, 358 U.S. 500 (1959).
190. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text. The essential eement of an action
under § 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982), is a showing of the likelihood of
consumer confusion as to source of origin. Granada, 816 F.2d at 74 (referring to Church of
Scientology Int'l v. The Elmira Mission of the Church of Scientology, 794 F.2d 38, 43 (2d
Cir. 1986); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 753 F.2d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1985); Berlitz Schools
of Languages, Inc. v. Everest House, 619 F.2d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1980); McGregor-Doniger,
Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1979); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry
Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978), cert denied,.439 U.S. 1116 (1979) (per curiam)).
191. 810 F.2d at 1510.
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court held that the parent company's sale of computer chips to a
U.S. distributor was not an attempt to evade any terms of the
trademark assignment and that a mere finding of consumer confusion
as to source was not enough to support an injunction in the parent-
subsidiary context. 192 The U.S. subsidiary had no expectation that
the parent company itself would not import computer chips into the
United States in competition with the plaintiff-subsidiary.'93 Argua-
bly, NEC is distinguishable from Original Appalachian Artworks,
Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc. because no parent-subsidiary rela-
tionship exists in the later case.
In Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics,
Inc., the court enjoined Granada from importing the dolls, holding
that the trademark owner could prevent the sale of "gray-market"
Cabbage Patch Kids dolls in the United States which were manufac-
tured abroad under the territorially-restricted license between OAA
and Jesmar S.A.194 The court appeared to suggest that the rationale
for excluding gray-market goods might be contractually-based.' 95
Because no contract existed between OAA and Granada, there could
be no breach of contract claim. The court did not address whether
Jesmar S.A. could be held liable for falling to police its distribution
of Cabbage Patch Kids dolls and for allowing the dolls to be imported
by .Granada into a territory unauthorized by the OAA-Jesmar li-
censing agreement. To the extent that the restrictive licensing agree-
ments are not in violation of antitrust laws, they should be enforceable
against parties to a contract as well as against any third party
beneficiaries.
The Supreme Court's opinion in COPIAT v. United States appears
to lend support to the requirement that the trademark owner preli-
minarly must seek, "at its option," a judicial determination of its
rights under contract or trademark law, then enlist the aid of the
Customs Service to stop the importation of gray-market products.' 96
While not a holding in COPIA T, the Supreme Court does appear to
be leaning toward the current rule that a trademark owner does not
have an absolute right to the exclusion of gray-market goods by the
Customs Service. 197 Rather, the mark owner must first pursue a
192. rd.
193. Id.
194. Granada, 816 F.2d at 70.
195. .Id.
196. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. at 1422.
197. Id.
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private claim against the gray-marketeer.19 However, the Court has
yet to rule on whether section 526 of the Trademark Act imposes an
affirmative duty on the Customs Service to exclude all gray-market
goods. Similarly, the propriety of a mark owner resorting to section
526, without first obtaining a judicial determination, has yet to be
decided. Logically, the burden of policing all licensing agreements
between transnational corporations, to determine if imported prod-
ucts are unauthorized "gray-market" goods, cannot be imposed on
the Customs Service. The mark owner-licensor has the responsibility'
to monitor and-control its own agreements, and to resolve any
improprieties that occur under these agreements. Lastly, the consti-
tutionality of inconsistent Customs regulations also is an open ques-
tion.
As noted earlier, the Customs Service has not enforced section
526, which appears to require the exclusion of all "gray goods" from
the U.S. market. The Customs Service continues to adhere to its
regulations and refuses to exclude gray-market imports when the U.S.
trademark holder has listed the manufacturer of the foreign products
in its application to register its trademark. 1' However, the trend in
the recent cases has been to follow the theory set forth in Vivitar.
This theory, followed in Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Granada Electronics, Inc., requires that the trademark owner first
bring a private suit to establish its legal rights prior to seeking
assistance of the Customs Service in excluding unauthorized gray-
market goods.m Until the Supreme Court holds otherwise, Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc. should
continue to represent the "model" for trademark owners seeking to
exclude gray-market goods regarded as unlawful under section 526
of the Tariff Act.201 After Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Granada Electronics, Inc., importers and distributors of gray-market
goods manufactured under a U.S. trademark are on notice that they
risk suit from the mark owner when they distribute those goods in
unauthorized territories. In a private suit brought by a trademark
198. Id.
199. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1055 (1986) (upholding customs regulations but not controlling with respect to the scope
of protection of § 526(c), allowing a United States trademark owner to seek a private remedy
against the grey marketeer).
200. Id. See also K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 1419, 1422 (recalandered
for argument on the merits, No. 86-625, March 7, 1988).
201. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir. 1987); cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 143 (1987).
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owner against a gray marketeer under section 32 of the Lanham Act,
the mark owner must prove (1) ownership of a genuine registered
trademark, (2) unauthorized use of the mark in the relationship
between the foreign entity and the trademark owner, and (3) damage
to the trademark's goodwill from the mere likelihood of potential
consumer confusion. 202
CONCLUSION
Gray-market importers contend that the lower prices of their
products benefit the consumer.203 However, the higher prices of
"legitimate goods" are justified by cost factors such as advertising,
quality control, and warranty service. 204 These costs enhance the
quality of the mark, thereby improving the transnational corpora-
tion's reputation and, in turn, its economic position.
Due to the practices of the gray marketeer, potential consumer
confusion is borne by the trademark owner, whose burden is increased
and reputation harmed. 205 Often the consumer is unaware when a
purchase is a gray-market product. The consumer expects that the
product's qualities and warranties will be guaranteed by the U.S.
trademark owner.20 The consumer is harmed if the mark owner fails
to honor warranties to repair or replace damaged gray-market goods.
The goodwill of the trademark is also harmed due to public mistrust
of the mark.207 The consumer who is unable to have a low-priced
"gray-market good" repaired will not want to run the risk of
purchasing another unwarranted product. Thus, there may be a
decision by the consumer to no longer purchase any products bearing
that trademark.
The sales price of a product is determined by the cost factors
outlined above. The gray marketeer, however, incurs no such costs
202. See A. Seidel, Common Law Trademark Infringement, Trademark Dilution, and
Lanham Act § 43(a): Can Gray Market Products Bearing Unregistered Trademarks Be Excluded
From Importation?, in GRAY MAas AN PARAILLEL IMPORTAToN: PRoTECToNsM vs. FRnn
TRADE 51 (1986). Concerning the similarities to the standards involved in a common law
trademark infringement suit. The Court in the instant case seems to be following the standards
set forth as to common law trademark infringement suits. In order to prevail on a claim of
common law trademark infringement a plaintiff must establish the same elements required to
prevail on a claim of statutory trademark infringement: (1) ownership of the mark, (2)
unauthorized use, and (3) a likelihood of confusion.
203. J. FrrZPATRiCK, supra note 14, at 9
204. Osawa & Co. v. B & H. Photo, 589 F. Supp. at 1167-68.
205. Id. at 1167.
206. Id. at 1169.
207. Id.
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in maintaining the high quality that a certain trademark represents. 08
The resulting burdens on the consumer and mark holders far
outweigh the benefits that the gray marketeer receives. Competition
in the market for any particular product is not precluded by a ban
on gray-market goods. One may still legitimately compete against a
mark holder; one is only required to do so without the use of a
genuine trademarked good. The gray-marketeer should not be allowed
a free-ride at the expense of the trademark owner.2
The Supreme Court's decision in COPIAT v. United States begins
to resolve the many problems that prevail in the area of gray-market
goods. The dicta in COPIAT, regarding the requirement that the
plaintiff seek a judicial determination as a prerequisite to customs
enforcement, suggests that the holding in Original Appalachian, Inc.
v. Granada, Inc. is accurate. Trademark owners must police the use
of their marks by first pursuing private claims in court prior to
seeking the assistance of the Customs Service in having competing
gray-market goods excluded.21
Mike H. Madokoro
208. Id. at 1167.
209. Id. at 1167-68.
210. See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), jurisdiction aff'd sub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 1419, 1422 (recalendared for argument on the merits, No. 86-625, March
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